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I.  Introduction
Africa's economic  history  since 1960  fits the classical  definition  of tragedy:  potential
unfulfilled,  with disastrous  consequences. In the 1960s,  a leading  development  textbook  ranked
Africa's  growth potential  ahead of East Asia's, and the World Bank's chief  economist  listed seven
African  countries  that "clearly  have the potential  to reach or surpass"  a 7 percent  growth rate.  '
Yet, these hopes went awry. Much of Africa has suffered  negative  per capita  growth since 1960,
and the seven  promising  countries  identified  by the World Bank's chief economist  were among
those with negative  growth.
This failure  has indeed  had dreadful  consequences.  In terms of GDP per capita, Sub-
Saharan  Africa  averaged  about $1,132  during the 1980s,  while GDP per capita averaged  $3,356
in Latin  America  and $5,048 in East Asia. 2 Out of the 20 poorest countries  in the world, 16 are
in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Africa's  growth tragedy is also reflected  in painful  human  scars. The
typical  African  mother  has only a 30 percent chance  of having  all of her children  survive  to age 5,
average  life expectancy  for a person  born in 1980  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  is only 48 years
compared  with 65 in Latin America,  and daily  calorie  intake  is only 70 percent of Latin America's
and East Asia's.
Not only is Sub-Saharan  Africa  poor, growth has been  the slowest  of any region  of the
world. On average,  real  per capita GDP did not grow in Africa  over the 1965-1990  period,  while,
in East Asia and the Pacific,  per capita GDP growth was over five  percent and Latin America
grew at almost  two percent per year. Figure l's map of the world illustrates  this distressing  point.
Shaded  countries  suffered  negative  real per capita GDP growth over the 1960-88  period. Almost
all of these countries  fall in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
This tragedy has drawn considerable attention. In addition to numerous journal articles, 3 a
stroll through  the Africa  section  of the library  reveals  an abundance  of books with titles such as
1 References  are to Enke  (1963) and Kamarck (1967), respectively.
2  These figures  are in Purchasing  Power  Parity adjusted  terms.
3 See World  Bank (1981, 1989,  1994a),  Bevan,  Collier, and Gunning  (1993),  Collier  and Gunning  (1992), Soludo
(1993),  Husain  and Faruquee  (1994),  Pack (1993), Lewis  (1986), Wheeler  (1984),  Ndulu  (1991), Elbadawi  (1992),
Elbadawi  and Ndulu  (1994),  Helleiner  (1986),  Fosu  (1992a,b,c),  Gyimah-Brempong  (1991),  Killick  (1991),  Berg
(1993),  Pickett  (1990),  Hadjimichael  et al. (1994),  and Rimmer  (1991).  Chhibber  and Fischer  (1992)  edited  a book3
Economic Crisis in Africa, The Destruclion of a Continent, The Crisis and Challenge of
African Development. Africa in Economic ('risis, Africa: Dimensions of the Economic
Crisis, and Africa:  What ('an Be Done? 4 Furthermore, the World Bank recently
produced two studies, Adjustment in Africa: Reform-s,  Results, and the Road Ahead
(World Bank, 1  994a) and Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from  Country Cases (Husain and
Faruquee, 1994),  that examine  the linkages  between  policy  reforms  and economic
performance  over the past decade.5 These  rigorous country-studies  identify  a diverse  set
of potential  causes  of Sub-Saharan  Africa's  ills ranging  from bad policies,  to poor
education,  to political  instability,  to inadequate  infrastructure,  to ethnic  strife,  etc. Clearly,
if economists  are to claim  any success  in explaining  why  some countries  are rich and
others  poor, Africa's  tragedy  must be part of the explanation. Similarly,  a great challenge
for policy  analysts  is to derive  policy  recommendations  and strategies  that will ignite
sustained  development  in Africa.
This paper uses one methodology - cross-country regressions - to examine cross-
country  growth experiences,  with special  attention  to Sub-Saharan  Africa,  over the last 30
years. We contribute  to the literature  by statistically  quantifying  the empirical  association
relationship  between  economic  growth and a wider  array of factors  than any existing
study. In addition  to standard  variables  such as initial  income  to capture convergence
effects,  schooling,  political  stability,  and indicators  of monetary,  fiscal,  trade, exchange
rate, and financial  sector policies,  we consider  new measures  of infrastructure
development,  cultural  diversity,  and economic  spillovers  from neighbors'  growth.  The
analysis:
(1) improves  substantially  upon past attempts to account  for the growth experiences  of
Sub-Saharan  African  countries,
on  economic  reform  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  which  discusses  changes  in exchange  rate,  fiscal,  financial
sector,  trade,  educational,  and regional  integration  policies  that  could  potentially  stimulate  sustained
owth  in Africa.
4  The  authors  of these  books  are, in order:  Blomstrom  and  Lundahl  (1993),  Borgin  and  Corbett  (1982),
Glickman (1988),  Ravenhill  (1986), Sadip  Ali and  Gupta  (1987), Turok  (1987).
5 The  former  has  recently  been  updated  in Bouton,  Jones,  and  Kiguel  (1994).4
(2) affirms  that low school attainment,  political  instability,  poorly  developed  financial
systems,  large black market  exchange  rate premia,  large government  deficits,  and
inadequate  infrastructure  are associated  with slow growth,
(3) finds  that Africa's  ethnic  diversity  tends  to slow growth and reduce the likelihood
of adopting  good policies,  and
(4) identifies  a strong  web of geographic  connections:  many  policies  in country  A are
closely  associated  with growth  in country  A; policies  in neighboring  country  B are
correlated  with policies  in country  A; and country  A's growth rate is strongly
correlated  with neighboring  country  B's growth rate, even after controlling  for policies
in country  A.
The relationship  between particular  policy  indicators  in one country  and growth in
its neighbors'  economy  suggests  that there may  be growth spillovers  with strategic  policy
implications.  While  requiring  much additional  work to establish  causal  relationships,  this
paper's results  are consistent  with the view that improving  policies  alone boosts growth
substantially,  but if neighboring  countries  act together,  the growth effects  are much larger.
Specifically,  the coefficients  suggest  that a policy  change  by a set of neighbors  will have an
effect  on growth  that is 2.2 times larger  than if a single  country  had acted alone.
The cross-country  regression  methodology  has numerous shortcomings  and should
not be the only method  used to study growth or draw conclusions  about Africa. 6 Cross-
country  regressions  do not establish  the direction  of causality  between  growth and the
policy  and political  indicators  that we study. We do not estimate structural  models  and
the coefficients  should  not be interpreted  as elasticities. Although  we sometimes  use the
coefficient  estimates  to exemplify  the strength  of the association  between  growth and
policy  indicators,  these examples  should  be interpreted  as suggestive  illustrations,  not as
exploitable  elasticities. We view the cross-country  regressions  as examining  the strength
6 For a discussion  of the weaknesses  with cross-country  growth  regressions,  see Levine  and Renelt  (1991)
and Levine  and Zervos  (1993).5
of the partial  correlation  between economic  growth and a variety  of economic  and political
indicators. As such, cross-country  regressions  offer complementary  information  to the
rigorous  country  studies  mentioned  above by permitting  a uniform  statistical  assessment  of
growth across  a wide array of countries.
I.  Using Cross-Country  Regressions  to Explain  Growth
Since  we are focusing  on long-run  growth,  we attempt  to abstract  from business
cycle  fluctuations  and study economic  performance  over decades. Specifically,  the
explanatory  variable  in our regressions  is the average  annual  growth rate of GDP per
capita in the 1960s, 1970s,  and 1980s  for all countries  with data (excluding  Gulf Oil
States). Thus, each country has three observations,  data permitting. We typically  have
193  observations.
A. Core  Regression:  Description
To explain  long-run  growth, we begin  with a "core" regression  that includes  a
fairly  standard  set of right-hand-side  variables  and then expand  this set in subsequent
sections. This subsection  describes  why  we include  each  "core" variable. In addition  to
different  intercept  terms for each decade,  we include  dummy  variables  for Sub-Saharan
Africa  and Latin  America  and the Caribbean  called  AFRICA  and LATINCA  respectively.
Barro (1991) found significant,  negative  coefficients  on both AFRICA  and LATINCA in
cross-country  regressions. These dunmny  variables  reflect  the inability  to explain  the poor
performance  of Africa  and Latin America  with variables  designed  to control for political,
economic,  and other measurable  characteristics. 7
Further,  we include  two variables  to control  for initial  income  (at the start of each
decade)  and thereby  capture the convergence  effect  highlighted  by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin  (1992). The economic  reasons  underlying  this convergence  effect are based  on the
'  The  Africa  dummy  variable  is  "robust"  as defined  by  Levine  and  Renelt  (1992).6
assumption that - all else equal - lower income countries will enjoy a higher marginal
productivity  of capital. This  should stimulate  domestic  investment  by residents  and
foreigners  that will raise  the capital/labor  ratio and generate  output growth and higher
wages. However,  Baumol  et al. (1992), Easterly  (1994), and others show that this
convergence  result is generally  non-linear,  first rising  and then falling  with per capita
income. To capture  the potential  non-linear  relationship  between  initial  income  and future
growth, we include  two terms:  the logarithm  of GDP per capita at the start of the decade
(INCOME)  and  the square  of the logarithm  of initial  income  at the start of each decade
(INCOMESQ).
The core regression  also includes  a measure  of human  capital. We use the
logarithm  of the average  educational  attainment  variable  constructed  by Barro and Lee
(1993a),  and call  this variable  SCHOOL. Countries  with better educated workers  should
have  greater growth opportunities  than countries  with citizens  with less education.  Also,
we attempt to control political  instability  by including  a measure  of political  assassinations,
ASSASS,  which  Barro (1991)  found to be negatively  associated  with growth. Although
not presented,  we used other indicators  of political  instability  that did not alter the
results. 8
Finally,  we include  three policy  indicators  in the core regression. We include  a
measure  of financial  development,  DEPTH,  which  equals liquid  liabilities  of the financial
system  divided  by GDP. 9 For many  countries  the ratio equals M2/GDP. King and Levine
(1993b) show  that DEPTH  responds  to financial  sector policies  in predictable  ways, and
King  and Levine  (1993a,b)  show  that DEPTH is closely  associated  with long-run  growth.
Also,  given the findings  by numerous  authors,  we include  a measure  of the black market
exchange  rate premium,  BLACK. Finally,  we measure  the fiscal  stance  of the country  by
8 For  example,  we  used  measures  of  civil  liberties,  the  number  of  revolutions  and  coups,  and  the  number
of  casualties  by  war. Also,  see  Barro  (1994).
9 Liquid  liabilities  includes  demand  deposits  and  interest  bearing  liabilities  of  banks  and  nonbanks.  On
finance  and  economic  development  also  see  Collier  and  Mayer  (1989).7
including the central government surplus to GDP ratio, SURPLUS.  '0 We experimented
with including a measure of inflation and with including the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP.  Inflation and trade indicators, however, typically did not enter significantly, nor
did they alter the following results."
B. Core Regression: Results
Table I presents the core regressions.  All of the variables are significant at the
0.05 significance level and of the anticipated sign.  Countries with greater financial
development, larger fiscal surpluses, and lower black market exchange rate premia grew
significantly  faster than countries with more shallow financial systems, large fiscal deficits,
and sizable black market premia.  The regression also indicates that political assassinations
are negatively correlated with long-run growth, while educational attainment is positively
linked to growth.
The coefficients on the catch-up variables, 0.096 on INCOME and -0.007 on
INCOMESQ, imply that the catch-up effect will be weaker for very poor countries and
strongest  for middle-income countries.  Specifically, the catch-up effect is a concave
function of initial income.  For the given parameter values, the catch-up effect is strongest
for countries with incomes of  about $1,600.12 Africa's average initial per capita income
is below $1,600.  Thus, the regression indicates that Africa should enjoy a catch-up effect,
but this effect will, on average be less pronounced for Africa because of the non-linear
association between initial income and growth whereby very poor countries enjoy less of a
catch-up effect than countries with incomes of around $1,600.
10 A  negative  relationship  between  government  deficits  and growth  has  earlier  been  found  by  Easterly
and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1995),  Fischer  (1993),  and Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993).
11  Trade  or export  shares  are generally  not significant  as explanatory  variables  in cross-country  growth
studies.  Helleiner  (1986)  has  previously  pointed  out  the lack  of explanatory  power  of export  shares  for
Africa  specifically.  A long-standing  strand  of the  literature  argues  that export  growth  is significant  (e.g.
Lussier,  1993,  recently),  but  using  export  growth  as a variable  raises  severe  causality  questions.
12 To  compute  this,  take  the derivative  of  the  core  regression  with  respect  to INCOME  and set this  to
zero:  0 = 0.0957  -(0.0067)(2)(INCOME).  Thus,  INCOME  = 7.36,  and initial  real  per  capita  GDP  with
the maximum  catch-up  effect  is  exp(7.36}  - 1,574.8
The dummy  variables  for both Sub-Saharan  African  countries  and Latin  America
and Caribbean  countries  are significant  and negative. These  two regions  of the world
grow significantly  more slowly  that predicted  by the cross-country  growth regressions.
However,  when we do a Chow test to see whether  the coefficients  of the core regression
are significantly  different  for only the sample  of Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  we cannot
reject  the hypothesis  that there are no differences. This implies  that the difficulty  in
accounting  for the tragedy of Africa  does not lie in different  sensitivities  to policy
variables. Nonetheless,  although  regression's  R 2 is a bit over 50 percent and the
coefficients  have  the expected signs,  we are unable  to account  adequately  for the poor
growth performance  of Africa  and Latin  America.
C.  Assessing Africa 's Performance
Using  the core regression  results presented  in Table 1, we now decompose  Africa's
performance  and compare  it to other regions  of the world (following  a similar  exercise  by
Barro and Lee (1993b),  which  was also emulated  for Africa  by Elbadawi  and Ndulu
(1994)). Table  2 gives average  values  of the variables  in the core regression  for different
groups  of countries. Africa  had worse policy  indicators  than other regions  of the world.
For example,  financial  depth in Africa  is less than half  of financial  depth in East Asia and
Pacific. Africa's  black market  premium  is 50 percent larger than the black market
premium  in the rest of the developing  country  world, and, on average,  Africa  has larger
government  deficits  than non-African  countries. Furthermore,  average  school attainment
is about 50 percent higher  in other developing  countries. Thus, poor policy  indicators  and
low human  capital,  as measured  by school  attainment,  link closely  with growth in Africa.
One can formally  decompose  the core regression  results by computing  that part of
the growth difference  between  Africa  and other countries  accounted  for by each of the
right-hand-side  variables  of the core regression. For example,  consider  Africa  versus non-
African  countries. Subtracting  Africa's  growth rate from non-African  country  growth9
rates  the difference  in growth rates is 2.3 percentage  points. 13 By subtracting  Africa's
value  for each explanatory  variable  from non-African  country  values and multiplying  this
difference  by the regression  coefficient,  we can compute  that part of the difference  in
growth  rates between  non-African  countries  and African  countries  associated  with by each
explanatory  variable.
The decomposition  results  are presented  in Table  3. The core regression  attributes
1.5 of the 2.3 percentage  point difference  in growth rates  between non-African  and
African  countries  to the Africa  dummy  variable. All  of three policy  indicators  (black
market  premium,  financial  depth, budget surplus)  combined  account  for about 0.9
percentage  points of the 2.3 percentage  point difference. Table  3 provides  comparisons
between  Africa  and non-Africa,  non-Africa  developing  countries,  and East Asian  and
Pacific  countries. The most remarkable  feature  of Table  3 is how much of the difference  is
associated  with  the Africa  dummy  variable. Since  the Africa  dummy  variable  really  just
measures  our ignorance - our inability to explain Africa's growth - this decomposition
highlights  that the variables  commonly  used in cross-country  regressions  do not account
for much  of Africa's  economic  performance.
Figure  2 provides  an illustrative  decomposition  and comparison  of the growth
performance  of Africa  versus East Asia, where  policy  differences  are greater. In 1960,
Africa's  GDP per capita was about $800 while  East Asia's  was about $1500. By 1989,
Africa's  GDP per capita was still  only about $900, while  East Asia's  had grown to about
$5,000. Figure  2 uses  the core regression  to decompose  the difference  in GDP per capita
between  these two regions  in 1989.  About $850 of the $4,100 gap is due to the original
13 Since  the  core  regression  includes  three  decade  dummy  variables  and a Latin  American  dummy
variable  in addition  to the  policy  indicators  and  the Sub-Saharan  Africa  dummy  variable,  we  adjust  the
growth  difference  to account  for the decade  and Latin American  dummy  variables  to focus  on that part of
the growth difference  not explained  by decade  dummy  variables  and the Latin American  dummy  variable.
Specifically,  the difference  between  African  and non-African  real  per capita GDP growth is 1.81
percentage  points. We then adjust this figure to take account  of the decade  and Latin American  dummy
variables  and arrive  at a difference  of 2.3% that must be accounted  for by policy, political,  and other
explanatory  variables.10
percentage gap in GDP per capita.  Policies (financial depth, black market premium, and
the government surplus) account for $1750 of the large gap that emerged over the 1960-
89 period. Initial income and schooling in each decade are associated with $450 of the gap
(the disadvantage of lower African schooling more than offsets the advantage of lower
initial income in Africa). About $1,050 of the $4,100 gap between East Asia and Africa
remains unexplained. It is to this gap that we now turn.  We attempt to reduce the size of
this unexplained gap by introducing non-traditional explanatory variables into the core
regression.
m.  Two Other  Explanations  For African  Growth
In this section, we attempt to account more fully for Africa's poor performance.
Although we examined the effects of  institutions'4, wars,5  terms of trade,16
infrastructure, and ethnic conflict, we concentrate on the links between growth and both
infrastructure and ethnic conflict due to data availability. Furthermore,  since data are
scarce and the SURPLUS variable reduces the sample considerably, we consider the
effects of incorporating indicators for infrastructure and ethnic conflict with and without
the government SURPLUS variable in the core regression.
A. Infrastructure
14 Many studies  of Africa  cite the hostile institutional  enviromment  for private  business  as a factor in the
growth  outcome  (see references  in World  Bank, 1994a).  Mauro (1993) and Knack and Keefer  (1994)
present  cross-country  evidence  that institutional  factors  affect economic  growth  using data from country
risk services for international  investors.  The country  risk indices measure  the degree  of corruption  in
business  dealings  with the government,  the prevalence  of bureaucratic  delays,  the risk of nationalization,
the degree to which contracts  are enforced,  and the general integrity  of the legal system.  The data on the
few  African countries  show that African  countries  are in the lower  half of the sample  in terms of
institutional  development.  Zaire, Liberia,  and Kenya are apparent  examples  of institutionally-hampered
growth.
Over the past 3 decades,  13 of the 20 worst military  conflicts  have  been in Africa.  However,  this
variable is not significant in the pooled  growth regressions.  This may be because  the most disruptive  wars
interrupt data collection.  We do not have complete  data on 10  of the 20 worst war experiencing  countries.
16 Bevan, Collier, and Gunning  (1989, 1993)  discuss  the crucial role of response  to terms of trade shocks
in macroeconomic  outcomes.  However,  Africa's terms of trade shocks  were no worse  than other LDC's
(World  Bank, 1994a),  which  we confirmed  in our data.11
Many studies of Africa cite the poor state of infrastructure.  Infrastructure
variables have the same rationale for inclusion in the growth regression as human capital
variables: they raise the marginal product of private investment in physical capital, and
thus the growth potential.  An influential study by Aschauer (1988) claimed that
infrastructure had large effects on US productivity growth; Canning and Fay (1993) and
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) have similar findings for the cross-country sample.'7 Easterly
and Rebelo used consolidated public sector investment in transport and communications;
these data are available for too few African countries to be of use here.
Canning and Fay (1993) present data on physical measures of infrastructure,
such as kilometers of roads and railways per worker, electricity-generating capacity per
worker, and telephones per worker.  Table 4 shows the averages of the 1960, 1970, and
1980 values of these infrastructure variables for Africa and the rest of the sample. We
insert the Canning and Fay variables into our core regression and the results are presented
in Table 5.  The initial stock of roads/railways and initial electricity generation are not
significantly  correlated with future economnic  growth.I 8
We do, however, find a strong link between growth and telephones per worker
as shown in regressions (2) and (5) in table 5.  The coefficient on telephones per worker
indicates that it is associated with perhaps I percentage point of Africa's 2.3 percentage
point lower growth relative to the rest of the sample.  We are dubious that the direct effect
of phones is really this large, but it may be a good indicator of the poor state of
infrastructure in general.  To use the East Asia benchmark once again, Hong Kong had
more telephones in 1960 than Nigeria, even though Nigeria's population was 17 times
larger.  By 1980, Hong Kong had more telephones than all of Sub-Saharan Affica.
17 An  earlier  cross-section  study  by  Khan  and Reinhart  (1990)  did not find  strong  growth  effects  of
infrastructure,  but this study  used  only  an indirect  measure  of infmstruture  investment.
18 Canning and Fay (1993)  also found  no direct effect  of these two  variables  in their OLS  panel
regressions  for growth  with  S-year  averages.  They  did  find strong  effects  of roads  and railways  on growth
in a fixed  effects  regression,  however.  Fixed  effects  seem  inappropriate  here,  since  this  paper  is trying  to
explain  the Africa  fixed  effect.12
The data shown  here may  even  understate  the extent  of the infrastructure  gap
between  Africa  and the rest of the world, as they do not correct for quality  of
infrastructure. For example,  Chad is shown  as having  15 thousand  telephones,  but 91
percent  of all local phones  calls  are unsuccessful.  Uganda  has two thousand  kilometers  of
paved  roads, but only 10 percent of them are in good condition.' 9
Although  infrastructure  seems  to matter,  the Africa  dummy  remains  significant  in
the regression  including  telephones. Africa  grows more slowly  than accounted  for by the
right-hand-side  variables.
B. Ethnic Diversity
Wars, institutional  weakness,  and even  bad policies  may  reflect a more
fundamental  characteristic  of African  societies,  great ethnic  diversity. High ethnic
diversity  may  lead  to increased  civil  strife,  political  instability,  and destructive
competitions  for rents by ethnic  factions. Shleifer  and Vishny  (1993) shows  how
corruption  is most damaging  when different  groups are competing  for payoffs.  It may  be
more difficult  to achieve  a consensus  for good policies  in a polarized  environment  as
indicated  by Alesina  and Drazen  (1991), Alesina  and Rodrik (1994), Alesina  and Tabellini
(1989), and Alesina  and Perotti (1994). We suspect  that ethnically  fragmented  societies
are prone  to competitive  rent-seeking  by the different  ethnic  groups and have difficulty
agreeing  on public  goods like  infrastructure,  education,  and good policies. Furthermore,
ethnic  diversity  may  favor policies  destructive  to long-run  growth like financial  repression
and overvalued  exchange  rates if such policies  create rents for the group in power  at the
expense  of other groups.
To examine  the effects  of ethnic  diversity,  we use a variable  constructed  by Mauro
(1993)  based on data originally  collected  by an institute  in the Soviet Union  in the 1960s.
19 Source:  World  Bank  (1  994b),  World  Development  Indicators,  Table  32.  These  data  are  not available
for  earlier  years,  so  we  cannot  insert  them  into  the regression.13
The variable,  ETHNIC,  measures  the probability  that two randomly  selected  individuals  in
a country  will belong  to different  ethnolinguistic  groups. ETIC  will increase  with the
number  of ethnolinguistic  groups and will increase  the more equal  is the size of the
groups. Canning  and Fay (1993) use a related  measure  based on the same  original  data:
the proportion  of the population  belonging  to the largest  ethnolinguistic  group and find
that growth  is positively  related  to size of the largest  ethnic  group.
Table  6 shows  the most and the least  ethnically  diverse  societies  in the world in
1960  in Mauro's data. Fourteen out of the fifteen  most ethnically  diverse  societies  in the
world are in Africa;  three of the East Asian  fast growers  are among  the most ethnically
homogeneous.
Table 5 regressions  (3),(4), (6), and (7) present  evidence  on the empirical
association  between  ethnic  diversity  and economic  growth. ETHNIC  is significantly
correlated  with growth, controlling  for other factors. The coefficient  on the ethnic
diversity  variable  implies  that it accounts  for 0.8 percentage  points of the 2.3 percentage
point gap between  Africa's  growth and the rest of the sample,  i.e., Africa's greater than
average  ethnic  diversity  accounts  for about 35% of its growth differential  with the rest of
the world. While  ethnic  diversity  is negatively  associated  with growth and Sub-Saharan
Africa  has great ethnic  diversity,  the Sub-Saharan  Africa  dummy  variable  tends to remain
significant  in the Table 5 regressions  that include  the ethnic  diversity  variable. We still
cannot  account  for Sub-Saharan  Africa's  slow  growth.
Importantly,  the ethnic diversity  variable  has a high  correlation  with the other
right-hand-side  variables.  Table  7 shows  that ethnic  diversity  is negatively  correlated  with
schooling  attainment,  with financial  depth, and with all three infrastructure  indicators:
roads, telephones,  and electricity. It is positively  correlated  with the black market
premium.  Quantitatively,  the data imply,  as noted above, that ethnic  diversity
independently  accounts  for about 35% of Africa's  growth  differential  with the rest of the
world,  but when  the effects  of ethnic  diversity  on policies  is also considered  this figure14
rises to 45% of Africa's growth differential.  Thus, ethnic diversity slows growth directly
and retards growth indirectly by making the adoption of good policies more difficult.
IV. Troubles with the Neighbors
The frequent  use in the literature  of a dummy  variable  for Africa  indicates  that the
poor growth performance  of Africa  is usually  thought  to be a fixed  effect  (e.g. Barro,
1991). What is striking  in the data is the regional  concentration  of both failure  (in Afiica)
and success (in  East Asia),  as well  as the variation  across  decades  (Africa  had done bettter
in the 1960s;  Latin  America  had a synchronized  crisis  in the 1980s).20  Recently,  an
insightful  pair of papers has suggested  that there are general spillovers  across borders from
unfavorable  characteristics  of one's neighbors,  like low  investment  or high political
instability,  to one's own growth performance  (Chua, 1993,  Ades and Chua, 1993).  These
authors report that the Africa  dummy  variable  becomes  statistically  insignificant  when
controlling  for spillovers  from one's neighbors.
A. Estimating  Neighbor  Spillovers
This paper extends  the work of these papers in two ways. First, we change  the
Chua  (1993) definition  of neighbor  effects  by weighing  each neighbor  by the size of its
total GDP, as opposed to Chua's equal weights. It seems  plausible  that Mexico  would  be
affected  more by the US than  by Belize,  and Cameroon  would  be affected  more by
gigantic  Nigeria  than by tiny Equatorial  Guinea. 21 Second,  instead  of putting the averages
of the neighbors'  right-hand  side variables  into the growth regression,  we put the average
20It is easy to forget that a number  of African  countries  were considered  success  stories well into the
1970s (Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya,  for example).  In fact, in every decade, there were some African
countries  with respectable  per capita growth rates -- even in the disastrous 1980s, 3 African  countries
grew in excess  of 3 percent  per capita. But few African  countries  sustained  healthy growth over time,
hence  the low average  growth for the continent.
21 We explore  furnher  different  weighting  schemes  for spillover  effects  from other countries.  We find that
weighting  by distance (which  was unsuccessful  in an earlier paper by De Long and Summers, 1992)
performs  poorly  in identifying  country  spillover  effects.15
of the neighbors'  growth  rate itself  into the regression. This allows  us to test for direct
contagion  effects  of growth successes  and failures. Because  there is simultaneity  in this
case -- you affect your neighbor and your neighbor affects you back -- we instrument for
the neighbors'  growth rate with the neighbors'  regressors  from the core regression. We
will then perform  a test of the overidentifying  restrictions  that the neighbors'  right-hand-
side variables  have no direct  effect  on growth (i.e. other than through  the growth
contagion  channel),  which  will  allow  us to test our contagion  hypothesis  against  the policy
spillovers  hypothesis.
Table 8 shows  two-stage  least squares  with the neighbors'  weighted  average
growth rate included  in the core regression  that excludes  the government  surplus. We use
the neighbors'  weighted  average  right-hand  side variables  as instruments. Each country's
neighbors'  growth rate has a surprisingly  large and statistically  significant  effect  on each
country's own growth:  one percentage  point more growth by the neighbors  in a given
decade translates  into higher  own  growth of .55 percentage  points. While  the Latin
America  dummy  variable  remains  uncomfortably  significant,  the Africa  dummy  becomes
insignificant  once the neighbors'  growth rate is included. 22
We also test whether  a country  A's neighbors  policies,  educational  attainment,
initial  income,  and political  stability  independently  affect  A's growth after controlling  for
its neighbors  growth rates. A test of the overidentifying  restrictions  that all of the
neighbors'  right-hand  side variables  have zero direct effect  on the country's own  growth
rate once its neighbors'  growth is considered  fails  to reject this set of restrictions.  The test
statistic  is TR 2 where  T is the number  of observations  and the R2 is from the regression  of
the residuals  in the regression  shown  in Table  8 on the set of all exogenous  variables,
22 With  SURPLUS  and the  neighbor's  growth  rate  both  included  in the  core  regression,  the  Africa
dummy  remains  insignificant,  but  P-value  on  the neighbors'  growth  rate  falls  to 0.06  and  the  coefficient  is
reduced  to 0.34.  Including  SURPLUS  eliminates  much  of the  data  from  the 1960s.  Since  the covariation
of neighbors  across  time  helps  distinguish  the neighbor  variable  from  the  Africa  dummy,  we  suspect  that
elimination  of the 1  960s  is responsible  for the  weaker  significance  of the neighbor  variable  in this
regression.16
including the neighbors' right-hand side variables. The test statistic, which is distributed
as X2 with 5 degrees of freedom (six excluded exogenous variables -- the neighbors'
right-hand-side variables -- minus one included endogenous variable), has a value of 8.35
and is not significant at the 5 percent level in the regression excluding the government
surplus. In the regression including SURPLUS, the test statistic has 6 degrees of freedom
and has a value of 10.65, still not significant at the 5 percent level.  Thus, the data do not
reject our econometric specification of using two-stage least squares with the neighbors
weighted average growth rate.
B. Where Do Neighbor Spillovers Come From?
Unfortunately, we can only speculate about where neighbor spillovers come from.
For example, if adapting a technology to a local environment is risky and involves fixed
costs, then a direct foreign investor who has had success in one country may find it easier
and more attractive to move next door to a neighboring country.  Thus, success in one
country could spillover to neighboring countries.  In addition to potentially lowering the
risk and cost of foreign investment, neighbor success may have demonstration effects.
Governments that attain high growth with a given set of policies provide a valuable model
of the efficacy of such policies to the government and citizenry of neighboring countries. 23
We have empirically examined one channel.  International trade does not appear to
be a very plausible mechanism for spillovers. African countries do not trade much with
each other.  Moreover, when we construct a spillover variable using trade weights, the
international trade spillover variable performs very poorly.
23 The growth literature  of course  features  much speculation  and (a little) evidence  about externalities  and
strategic  complementarities,  which finds external effects  of human or physical  capital across  industries
(Caballero  and Lyons, 1989, 1990),  and within cities (Rauch, 1992).  Strategic  complementarities  have
also been suggested  as a factor  that explains  booms  and busts in business  cycles  (see Hall, 1991,  and the
survey  by Cooper  and Haltiwanger,  1993). Borjas  (1994)  and Case and Katz (1991) find contagion  from
individuals' neighbors  in socioeconomic  outcomes  in American  cities. Calvo and Reinhart (1995) show
how there is contagion in capital flows from large Latin American  countries to their small neighbors.17
What about the transmission  of growth  failures  across  borders? Governments  do
not necessarily  maximize  growth;  they  may maximize  rent-seeking  opportunities. Even
policies  that are bad for growth could  be imitated  by neighbors  if they are demonstrated  to
be good for creating  rent-seeking  opportunities  or some  other non-growth  objective  that is
desired  by policy-making  elites.
We find  that our observable  policy  indicators  and the other right-hand  side
variables  from Table  8 are indeed  highly  correlated  across  neighbors  (Table  9). This gives
a hint that unobservable  government  or private  sector behavior  contained  in the residual
may  be correlated  as well.
We acknowledge  that the replacement  of the Africa  dummy  by a growth spillover
effect  really  only  changes  the kind of mystery. More research  is needed  to go inside  the
black  box. Our results suggest  that research  on growth interactions  between countries
would  be another  fruitful  area to add to the study of countries' individual  characteristics.
C. Neighbor  Multipliers
The implications  of a growth contagion  effect  are very different  from an Africa
dummny  effect. If we presume  a particular  causal  direction  for illustrative  purposes,  the
contagion  effect  says  that Africa's  lagging  growth relative  to policy  variables  will
disappear  if a critical  mass  of countries  improve  their policies. The Africa  dummy  effect
said  that Africa's  growth would  always  be worse for a given set of policies. The good
news  about the contagion  effect  - if one assumes  that causality  runs from policies  to
growth - is that the negative  contagion  effect  of the last 30 years could be changed  to a
positive  contagion  effect  in the next 30 years: a large policy  change  in unison  would  have
a multiplier  effect  on the countries  in the region  that is even larger than the strong,  direct
effect  of a country's policies  on its own growth rate.
If a country  reforms  alone,  there will  be a small  spillover  to its neighbor's growth
rate, which  in turn spills  back  over into the country's own growth rate. Given  that most18
countries  have  4 or more neighbors,  these spillover  effects  are fairly  small  as shown  in the
Appendix. From our estimates,  the median  country  changing  policies  in isolation  has a
neighbor  multiplier  of 1.041;  that is, the total effect of one's policies  on one's own growth
rate taking  into account  neighbor  feedback  is only 4 percent larger  than the direct  effect of
one's own policies  on one's own growth.
However,  if all countries  act together, the neighbor  multiplier  is much larger. This
is because  all of the home country's neighbors  are acting  together  to increase  their own
growth, which  increases  the home  country's growth by a large amount  in addition  to the
direct effect  of the home  country's policy  change. If we suppose  that policy  changes  are
identical  for a closed set of neighbors,  the multiplier  will be [l/(I-b)I, or 2.2 where b is the
estimated  coefficient  on one's weighted  average  of neighbor  growth rates, estimated  by us
at .55. That is, a set of neighbors  adopting  a set of policy  changes  that would  have raised
growth by 1.04  percentage  points  if they had each acted alone  will see growth increase  by
2.2 percentage  points  if they act together. This also works in the other direction:  with a
set of neighbors  all simultaneously  adopting  bad policies  like  exchange  rate controls
leading  to a high  black market  premium,  the negative  effect  on all of them would  be
magnified.
It is important  to emphasize  that our results do not imply  that countries  would  be
better off free-riding  on their neighbors'  good policies  rather than making  their own policy
changes. The typical  free rider problem  arises  because one's own actions  have  only a
negligible  effect  on the benefit  one obtains;  here, one's own policies  stili  have a stronger
effect  on one's own growth than they do on the neighbor's  growth. Nor is there any
incentive  to wait for the other country  to move first, since  with our additive  specification
the marginal  growth benefit  of changes  in one's own policies  is the same  regardless  of
whether  the neighbors  have good or bad policies.  These  results do suggest  that acting  in
unison  has magnified  effects  for good or evil.19
V. Conclusions
This paper sheds additional light on accounting for long-run growth across all
countries with a particular emphasis on understanding Africa's growth tragedy.  In short,
we find that poor growth is strongly associated with  (1) low schooling, (2) political
instability, (3) under-developed financial systems, (4) distorted foreign exchange market,
as measured by the black market premium, (5) high government deficits, (6) low
infrastructure, (7) ethnic fractionalization, (8) spillovers from neighbors that
magnify (1) - (7).
The two most novel features of our results are our findings on ethnic diversity and
contagion. Both findings require further investigation into the mechanisms at work. What
are the mechanisms by which ethnic diversity results in high black market premia and low
spending on public goods? What other mechanisms explain the link from ethnic diversity
to growth? What causes neighboring countries to imitate each others' policies? Why is
there a spillover to your growth from your neighbor's growth?  The findings on the role of
ethnic diversity and contagion in Africa point towards interesting directions in further
research on both the fundamental determinants of bad policies and the interactions
between neighboring country policies and growth performance.20
Appendix: Calculating policy multipliers with spillovers of growth to neighbors
Section  IV of the paper presents  evidence  that a country's own  growth is
influenced  by a weighted  average  of its neighbors'  growth rates. We present  in this
appendix  the algebraic  implications  of these spillovers  for magnifying  the effects  of policy
changes.
For a given  time period,  we can write the system  of equations  determining  cross-
country  growth rates for n countries  as follows:
(A.1)G=PA+bWG
where  G is an n x I vector of growth rates for the n countries  over the given  time period,
P is an n x q matrix  of country  policies  and other characteristics,  A is a q x I vector  of
coefficients  on policies,  b is a scalar measuring  the degree of spillover  from one's
neighbors  to one's own  growth, W is an n x n matrix  of weights  on one's neighbors  to
calculate  the weighted  average  of their growth  rates. The rows of W sum  to unity; the
diagonal  elements  of W are zero. Recall  that the weights  in W were calculated  using  the
total GDP of neighboring  countries.  For example,  if country I has as neighbors  countries
2, 3, and  4 with GDPs respectively  of 100, 100,  and 200, the first row of W will  be [0 .25
.25.5  0 0 0 0  .........  0].
We can then solve for the growth rate vector G as:
(A.2) G= (I-bW)-y  PA
The elements  of the inverse  matrix  (I-bW)-' contain  the multipliers  and cross effects  by
which  neighbor  spillovers  increase  the effect  of policy  changes  in the system.  The element
mij  of the matrix  has the following  interpretation:  a set of policy  changes  by country  j
increasing  country  j's growth rate by I percentage  point will raise country  i's growth rate
by mij.
The diagonal  elements  of (I-bW)-I  are the multipliers  by which  the effect on the
country's own growth of the country's own policy  changes  are magnified  through
spillovers.  Hence,  a policy  change  by country  i that would have  directly  raised country  i's21
own growth rate by I percentage  point (according  to the A coefficients)  will  raise it by m
percentage  points once  the indirect  effect  of the neighbor  feedback  is taken into account.
This indirect  effect  occurs because  country  i's policy  change  raises its neighbors'  growth,
which  in turn feeds  back on country  i's own growth. We have  calculated  these diagonal
elements  with the estimated  b coefficient  and the GDP weights,  and find  them to be only
modestly  above  unity  for most countries.
What is the multiplier  if all countries  change  their policies  in unison?  Let us think
of a set of policy  changes  in unison  that would  have the direct effect  of raising  each
country's own  growth rate by I percentage  point. Such as a set of policies  would  satisfy
the following  equation:
(A.3)  P A = i
where P is an n x q matrix  with identical  rows, made  up of changes  in the q types of
policies,  A is the same  n x I vector of coefficients  on policies  as before,  and i is the n x I
unit vector. Then  the change  in growth rates (given  as the n x I vector G) as a result of
the policy  changes  in unison  is given  by:
(A.4) G = (I-bW)-'i = (1-b)-'i
We can see from A.4 that the neighbor  multiplier  for a policy  change  in unison  is given
simply  by taking  the row totals of the (I-bW)-'  matrix. Given  that the row totals of W are
all equal to one, it is easy to show that the row totals of (I-bW)-' are all equal to 1/(1-b),
which  is the second equality  in (A.4). Hence,  the multiplier  with an estimated  b coefficient
of .55 is 2.2. In other words, a policy  change  in unison  that would  have had the direct
effect  of raising  growth in each country  by I percentage  point  will raise it by more than
twice that much  when all neighbors  act together.22
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Figure 2: Decomposing the growth gap between
East Asia and Africa
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Table 1: Core Regression.




















Financial  Depth  0.0205
(3.12)
Black Market Premnium  -0.0187
(3.69)
Fiscal Surplus  0.1215
(2.48)
No. of observations  193
R-squared  0.54
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent  t-statistics  are reported in parenthesis.
LRGDP  is Log (Initial  real per capita  GDP) and LRGDPSQ  is the same
variable  squared,  Schooling  is I + Average  years of school  attaimnent  of the
working  age population,  as calculated  by Barro  and Lee (1993),  Depth is
ratio of liquid liabilities  of the financial  sector  to GDP. Regressions  sample
is pooled  cross-section,  decade  averages.31
Table 2:  Averages: Africa vs. Other Country Samples
Africa  Non-Africa  Non-Africa  East Asia
Non-OECD  & Pacific
Growth of per capita real GDP  0.0059  0.0240  0.0210  0.0417
Income  6.8375  7.9999  7.6660  7.7545
School  1.0041  1.6007  1.4152  1.5741
Assassinations  1.08E-05  4.95E-05  6.78E-05  3.44E-06
Financial Depth  0.2198  0.4237  0.3524  0.4736
Black Market Premium  0.3963  0.1896  0.2611  0.0536
Fiscal Surplus  -0.0492  -0.0390  -0.0416  -0.0246
No. of obs.  34  159  114  23
Note: See variable definitions  and sources in Appendix, Table  Al.32




Non-Africa  & Pacific
Growth  difference  to be explained:
(Sample growth - Africa growth)  2.3%  3.3%
Of which  explained  by:
AFRICA  dummy  1.5%  1.5%
Initial  Income  -0.7%  -0.3%
Log (Schooling)  0.7%  0.6%
ASSASS  -0.1%  0.0%
DEPTH  0.4%  0.5%
BLACK  0.4%  0.6%
SURPLUS  0.1%  0.3%
Policy  variables:
(DEPTH,  BLACK,  SURPLUS)  0.9%  1.5%
Note: The underlying  regression  usedfor the above  decomposition  includes  three
decade  dummies. The Initial Income term shows the net effect of the variables  Initial
per capita GDP and Initial per capita GDP squared  The regression is based on pooled
cross-sections  for 1960s,  1970s,  and 1980s.  The growth  difference  to be explained  is
adjustedfor decade  composinon  and the effect of the separate  Latin America  dummy is
removedfrom the difference  with the non-Africa  sample.33
Table 4: Averages of Infrastructure Indicators, 1960-1980
Sub-Saharan Africa  Other Developing  Industrial
Countries  Countries
Telephones per 1000 workers  14  70  485
Kilowatts of electricity generating  118  277  1936
capacity per 1000 workers
Kilometers of roads and railways  1  3  16
per 1000 workers
Source: Canning and Fay (1993)34
Table 5:  Pooled Decade Groowth  Regressions with Non-traditional  Variables.
Dependent Variable  is Growth of Per Capita  Real GDP.
Core Rcgression excluding Fiscal Surplus  Core Regression including Fiscal Surplus
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
AFRICA  -0.0165  -0.0194  0.0143  -0.0154  -0.0167  -0.0112  -0.0124
(4.04)  (4.25)  (2.87)  (2.84)  (3.13)  (1.87)  (1.93)
LATINCA  -0.0150  -0.0162  -0.0188  -0.0183  -0.0174  -0.0191  -0.0193
(4.65)  (4.95)  (5.84)  (5.59)  (5.36)  (5.84)  (6.15)
INCOME  0.0667  0.0660  0.0562  0.0616  0.1072  0.0869  0.1049
(3.03)  (3.07)  (2.60)  (2.85)  (4.39)  (3.49)  (4.18)
INCOMESQ  -0.0049  -0.0056  -0.0044  -0.0053  -0.0082  -0.0063  -0.0080
(3.39)  (3.92)  (3.08)  (3.67)  (5.21)  (3.89)  (4.89)
Log (Schooling)  0.0115  0.0057  0.0119  0.0080  0.0087  0.0117  0.0105
(2.83)  (1.27)  (3.03)  (1.78)  (1.73)  (2.47)  (2.13)
Assassinations  -17.6182  -16.7398  -14.4453  -14.5338  -20.1476  -12.7993  -18.5198
(2.75)  (2.51)  (2.08)  (1.96)  (3.17)  (1.59)  (2.56)
Financial Depth  0.0180  0.0120  0.0135  0.0107  0.0137  0.0162  0.0124
(2.88)  (1.80)  (2.16)  (1.62)  (2.15)  (2.47)  (1.97)
Black  Market  -0.0237  -0.0245  -0.0230  -0.0249  -0.0176  -0.0188  -0.0189
Premium  (6.02)  (5.45)  (6.10)  (5.62)  (2.97)  (3.79)  (3.08)
Fiscal Surplus  0.1985  0.1211  0.1946
(4.61)  (2.74)  (4.57)
Log (Telephones  0.0076  0.0059  0.0074  0.0051
per worker)  (3.47)  (2.55)  (3.13)  (2.03)
ETHNIC60  -0.0164  -0.0134  -0.0170  -0.0122
(2.96)  (2.22)  (2.78)  (1.86)
No.  of observations  244  222  236  219  178  188  175
R-squared  0.50  0.52  0.52  0.54  0.59  0.57  0.61
Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in paranthesis.  Regression includes seperate decade dumnmies  not reported above.
ETHNIC60 is index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  See text for further details.35
Table  6: Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  Index (ETHNIC)
66 Countries, 1960
Country  ETHNIC  Country  ETHNIC
15 Most Fractionalized.  15 Least Fractionalized:
Tanzania  93  Korea  0
Uganda  90  Haiti  I
Zaire  90  Japan  I
Cameroon  89  Portugal  I
India  89  Hong Kong  2
South Africa  88  Yemen  2
Nigeria  87  Germany  3
Ivory Coast  86  Burundi  4
CAR  83  Dominican Rep.  4
Kenya  83  Egypt  4
Liberia  83  Ireland  4
Zambia  82  Italy  4
Angola  78  Norway  4
Mali  78  Jamaica  5
Sierra Leone  77  Jordan  5
Note:  ETHNIC  measures  probability  that two randomly  selected  persons  from a given
country  will not belong  to the same  ethnolinguistic  group. The more  groups  there are,
higher  the ETHNIC.  The  more  equally  distributed  the groups,  the  higher  ETHNIC.
Source:  Taylor and Hudson, World  Handbook  of Political and Social Indicators  (1972)..36
Table 7: Correlations  of Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  and Policy Indicators
Correlalion wilh
Indicator  ETHNIC. 1960
Log of School Years  -0.43 *
Financial Depth  -0.32 *
Black Market Premium  0.21 *
Government Surplus / GDP  -0.09
Log of Telephones per Worker  -0.50  *
Log of Kilometers of Roads
& Railways per Worker  -0.31 *
Log of Electricity Generating
Capacity per Worker  -0.45 *
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.  01 level.37
Table  8: Neighbor  Regressions:  Two-stage  least-squares
Dependent  variable  is growth  of per capita  real GDP (GYP
Variable  (1)  (2)
Intercept  -0.1832  -0.3788
(2.18)  (3.84)
DUM70  0.0011  0.0033
(0.31)  (0.99)
DUM80  -0.0046  -0.0053
(0.77)  (0.99)
AFRICA  -0.0054  -0.0094
(0.69)  (1.38)
LATINCA  -0.0095  -0.0142
(2.17)  (3.52)
INCOME  0.0574  0.1098
(2.68)  (4.31)
INCOMESQ  -0.0043  -0.0078
(3.06)  (4.65)
Log (Schooling)  0.0125  0.0163
(3.01)  (3.40)
Assassinations  -17.0179  -15.0943
(2.52)  (2.37)
Financial Depth  0.0092  0.0136
(1.27)  (1.90)
Black Market Premium  -0.0205  -0.0120
(5.00)  (2.62)
Fiscal Surplus  0.1494
(3.57)
Neighbors'  Average Growth  0.5543  0.3364
(2.47)  (1.92)
No. of observations  234  169
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent  t-statistics  in parentheses.  Sample  is pooled 1960
70s, and 80s data. "Neighbors's  Average  Growth"  is per  capita real GDP  growth
using 1960  GDP weights  for  the neighbors  of each country.38
Table 9: Correlations of right-hand side variables for each country with the
average for its neighbors
correlation  t-statistic  on  # observations
coefficient  bivariate
association
Initial  income  0.77  22.3  333
Log (Schooling)  0.70  16.0  273
Assassinations  0.41  7.9  319
Financial  Depth  0.55  11.3  299
Black  market Premium  0.24  4.3  323
Fiscal  Surplus  0.27  4.0  207
Note: Sample is pooled 1960s. 19  70s, 1980s data. Neighbors 'averages are
immediate neighbors weighted by their respective 1960 GDP s.39
Appendix:  Table  Al  Variable  Description
Variable  Description
DUM60  Dummy  variable  for 1960s
DUM70  Dummy  variable  for 1970s
DUM80  Dummy  variable  for 1980s
AFRICA  Dummy  variable  for Sub-Saharan  African  countries.
LATINCA  Dummy  variable  for Latin Amercia  and the Carribean.
INCOME  Log (Initial  real per capita  GDP). Source:  Summers  & Heston,  PWT 5.0
(1991)
INCOMESQ  INCOME  squared
SCHOOL  Log (1 + average  years of school  attainment,  decade  average. Source:
Barro & Lee (1993a))
Assassinations  (ASSASS)  Number  of assassinations  per million  population,  decade  average.  Source:
Barro (1991).
Financial  Depth  (DEPTH)  Ratio  of liquid  liabilities  of the financial  system  to GDP, decade  average.
Source:  World  Bank.
Black  Market  Premium  Log (I + Black  Market  Premium  on the exchange  rate), decade  average.
(BLACK)  Source:  World  Bank.
Fiscal  Surplus  (SURPLUS)  Decade  average  of ratio of central  government  surplus  (+) to GDP, both in
local currency,  current  prices. Source: IMF International  Financial
Statistics.
ETHNIC  Index  of ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,  1960. Measures  probability  that
two randomly  selected  people  from  a given  country  will not belong  to the
same  ethnolinguistic  group. Source:  Taylor & Hudson  (World  Handbook
of Political  and Social  Indicators)
NEIGHBOR  Weighted  average  for the growth  of per capita real GDP of the neighbors
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